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GLOBAL EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 





Global experimentalist governance has emerged within and across a number of international 
regulatory regimes, but its potential contribution to the global governance of climate change 
remains largely unexplored. This article investigates the opportunities and barriers to 
developing global experimentalist governance approaches in the international regulation of 
climate change technologies, focusing on the recent framework for marine geoengineering 
under the London Dumping Protocol. It argues that, in the face of the limits of international 
law in dealing with uncertainty, multilevel distribution of power and regulatory 
disconnection, global experimentalist governance is attractive to catalyze adaptability, 
iterative learning, participation and cooperation. Such approach can help re-think the way 
international law deals with technological development, by emphasizing its problem-solving 
function.  
 
Keywords: experimentalist governance, climate change, geoengineering, ocean iron 
fertilization, cooperation, participation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
As ‘one of the more profound and, to date, intractable sets of problems confronting 
humanity’,1 scholars have attempted to disentangle the global governance of climate change 
most prominently through the paradigms of regime complex, orchestration and transnational 
networks.2 In this important academic debate, though, the potential contribution of global 
experimentalist governance has been left largely unexplored. This is surprising as 
experimentalist approaches have received considerable attention as a new mode of 
governance for emerging challenges. These governance practices rely on participatory and 
collaborative processes, where problems and solutions are widely debated, framed in an 
open-ended way, and subjected to periodical revision on the basis of local experience.3  
Experimentalist practices have emerged at national and regional (especially EU) 
level, but they are by no means exclusive of regulatory settings within States, nor of the 
relatively unique transnational regulatory environment of the EU. At a supranational level, 
the recourse to global experimentalist governance practices sheds some light on the 
function, and limits, of international law in dealing with diversity, complexity, multiple 
legal orders and actors, the relative weakness of systems of coercion, knowledge deficit and 
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uncertainty.4 In an international order where international law fails to respond to strategic 
uncertainty and polyarchic distribution of power, experimentalist governance encourages 
recursive learning, cooperation between different levels of governance and deliberative 
participation of non-state actors and civil society (section II).   
It is precisely by reflecting on the challenges of uncertainty and multilevel distribution of 
power in climate change governance that global experimentalist governance constitutes a 
potentially attractive model for rethinking the function of international law, by emphasizing 
its transformative nature and enhancing its problem-solving function (section III).5 These 
issues become even more acute in the context of technological responses to climate change, 
ranging from the relatively mundane to the extremely challenging, from loft insulation 
through wind turbines on a variety of scales, carbon capture and storage, and, most recently, 
ambitious geoengineering. They are at different stages of development, with in some cases 
significant risks, uncertainties, and unknowns.6 They have the potential to respond to climate 
change, but pose unprecedented governance challenges, as this is an area where socio-ethical 
concerns are pervasive, decision-making is multilevel, and the role of law sometimes 
becomes problematic. 
Against this background, the article explores the opportunities and barriers to 
developing global experimentalist approaches in the international regulation of climate 
change technologies, focusing on the emerging regulation of marine geoengineering. The 
term ‘geoengineering’ refers to a variety of techniques aimed at the ‘deliberate large-scale 
manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change’.7 
Owing to the lack of substantive progress in global emission reduction, these techniques are 
proposed by some as a means to go beyond mitigation by artificially modifying the climate 
system. Although their scientific and technical development is still in its infancy, they 
already present difficult social, legal and political hurdles. 8  Not only are there large 
differences amongst geoengineering technologies in terms of risks, uncertainties, feasibility 
and public acceptability; but the concept of manipulating the climate remains controversial 
in itself (section IV).  
Considering their global scale and -intended and unintended- impact, it is not 
surprising that the debate on governance and regulation started at an international level.9 
Here, the dominant approach is to focus on evaluating the potential applicability of existing 
international treaties and customary international law norms and principles to 
geoengineering techniques. 10  Although this is a necessary starting point, existing 
international law instruments and institutions appear ill-equipped to effectively regulate all 
geoengineering methods, or all aspects of the most controversial methods, as they generally 
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2 Global Environmental Change 111.   
7 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate – Science, Governance and Uncertainty [2009], xi. 
8 ibid  57.  See in general, WCG Burns and AL Strauss (eds), Climate Change Geoengineering – Philosophical Perspectives, 
Legal Issues, and Governance Frameworks (CUP 2013). 
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Climate?’ (1996) 33 Climatic Change 309. 
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Technology and Dangerous Climate Change’) 9; C Redgwell, ‘Geoengineering the Climate: Technological Solutions to 
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lack the flexibility needed to cope with strategic uncertainty, multilevel distribution of 
power, and the pace of technological development. Addressing these limits, this article 
views experimentalist governance practices as a tool to help redirect international law 
towards effective and adaptive governance and, ultimately, strengthen its problem-solving 
function, should these technologies be implemented (section V).  
Based on this argument, the article investigates the extent to which the recent marine 
geoengineering amendment to the Protocol to the London Convention on Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter at Sea could represent an example of experimentalist governance 
(section VI).11 In common with experimentalist governance, this new regime is structured 
through provisional framework goals and metrics; decentralized implementation; regular 
reporting and peer-review obligations; and periodical re-evaluation and review of goals and 
decision-making practices.  However, the limited scope (and mechanisms) for cooperation, 
aggravated by the absence of penalty defaults, and restricted opportunities for public 
participation constitute the main barriers to this regime’s ability to encompass an ideal type 
of global experimentalist governance. Addressing the governance challenges of climate 
change technologies through an experimentalist model is nevertheless interesting, as it might 
provide an attractive normative approach to tackle uncertainty, reflect multipolar distribution 
of power between State and non-state actors, and re-conceptualize the way international law 
deals with technological development. 
II. GLOBAL EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE: RATIONALE, 
ELEMENTS AND CONDITIONS  
 
Since the 1990s, multiple approaches have shaped the language of ‘global governance’.12 
The notion of governance, as opposed to the one of government, prominently responds to 
the limits of States’ individual action, and to the growing influence of a wider range of non-
state actors in key areas of international relations and law.13 From this perspective, the 
unitary idea of a sovereign, hierarchical, regulatory State needs rethinking, as States are now 
called to deal with issues that do not have obvious solutions and involve multilevel and 
transnational interactions and cooperation.14 ‘Global governance’ then suggests a system of 
norms, processes and structures established, and implemented, by a constellation of State 
and non-state actors (e.g. private actors, business, NGOs, international organizations) 
formally and informally operating within the international order.15 This notion points not 
only to the multilevel architecture of the system, but also to its pluralistic inspiration, calling 
for greater accountability, transparency and legitimacy. Inevitably, trends and modes of 
global governance have mutated over time to reflect increasing fragmentation, regime 
complexity, network orchestration and transnational dynamics.16  
                                                 
11 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (London), 11 ILM (1972) 
1294 (‘LC’); Protocol to the London Dumping Convention (London) 36 ILM (1996) (‘LP’). 
12 D Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 Ohio National University Law Review 827  
13 J Rosenau and EO Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations 1992).  
14  K Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Law and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergency of Global Regulatory 
Governance’ (1999) 6(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 425; BC Karkkainen, ‘Post-Sovereign Environmental 
Governance’ (2004) 4(1) Global Environmental Politics 72. See also A Mc Grew and D Held (eds), Governing Global 
Transformations: Power, Authority and Global Governance, (Polity Press 2002). 
15 M Zurn, ‘Global Governance as Multi-level Governance,’ in D Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance 
(OUP 2012) 730. 
16 eg ML Djelic and K Sahlin Andersson (eds.), Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (CUP 
2008); F Biermann et al, ‘The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architecture: A Framework for Analysis’ (2009) 9(4) 
Global Environmental Politics 14; K Abbott et al, ‘Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries’ (Conference 
on International Organizations as Orchestrators, Munich, September 2012) 
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Responding to these transformations, experimentalist governance has emerged as a 
‘template for governance reform in new areas’.17 This entails ‘an institutionalized process of 
participatory and multilevel collective problem-solving, in which the problems (and the 
means to address them) are framed in an open-ended way and subjected to periodic revision 
by various forms of peer review, in the light of locally generated knowledge’.18 While this 
process retains a normative dimension, it does not operate within formal command-and-
control mechanisms, as it favors ‘regulatory approaches which are less rigid, less 
prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature’.19  In 
exploring its contours, de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel refer to ‘a set of practices involving 
open participation by a variety of entities (public or private), lack of formal hierarchy within 
governance arrangements, and extensive deliberation throughout the process of decision 
making and implementation’.20 Experimentalist governance practices can be recognized in 
various settings (e.g. private or public initiatives), operate at different levels of decision-
making (e.g. local, national, regional or international) and emerge within and between 
regulatory regimes.    
As a new mode of governance, experimentalist governance prominently responds to 
two specific challenges: ‘strategic uncertainty’ and ‘polyarchic distribution of power’.21 
‘Strategic uncertainty’ is said to arise where ‘the parties face urgent problems, but know that 
their preferred problem-solving strategies fail and therefore are willing to engage in a joint, 
deliberative (potentially preference-changing) investigation of possible solutions’.22 Strictly 
linked to this paradigm, ‘polyarchic distribution of power’ is the result of situations where 
horizontal, non-hierarchical, decision-making dynamics between State and non-state actors 
lead to a conundrum where no actor has the capacity to impose its own preferred solution, 
without taking into account other views.23  
 Of course, there is no single correct model of experimentalist governance, but rather 
an ‘ideal type’ against which evaluating governance practices as ‘a basic default account of 
the world’. 24  This ideal type represents a multilevel architecture, based on four 
‘deliberation-fostering elements’.25 First, the elaboration of framework goals and metrics for 
evaluating their achievement represents the foundation of the system. The open-ended 
nature of these goals means that they can have a provisional character, as they adjust to 
changing circumstances and are shaped by diverse experiences and local contexts, including 
new technological and scientific knowledge. Second, the implementation of these open-
ended goals is left to ‘lower-level’ units– such as national authorities, local communities, or 
scientists - in coordination with the ‘centre’ and in consultation with civil society. This is 
where ‘lower level’ actors are recognized large discretion in adapting and experimenting 
                                                                                                                                                       
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125452>; T Gehring and B Faude, ‘The Dynamics of Regime 
Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic Effects’, (2013) 19 Global Governance 119. 
17 CF Sabel and J Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (OUP 
2010) 9. 
18 de Búrca Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 477. 
19 G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (OUP 2006) 2. 
20 G de Búrca, RO Keohane and CF Sabel, ‘New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance’ (2013) 45(3) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 723, 738. 
21 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17) 9. Experimentalism is a main characteristic of wider ‘new governance’ approaches, at times 
resulting in an overlap in terminology between ‘new governance’ and ‘experimentalist governance’. See de Búrca and Scott 
(n 19); J Scott and DM Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Governance Approaches’ (2002) 8(1) European Law Journal 
1. 
22 CF Sabel and J  Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’, in D. Levi-Faur (n 15) 179. 
23 CF Sabel and J Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’, 
(2008) 14 (3) European Law Journal 271. 
24 N Walker, ‘EU Constitutionalism and New Governance’ in de Búrca and Scott (n 19) 23. 
25 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 478. 
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problem-solving practices, based on contingent knowledge and decentralized authority. 
Third, regular reporting obligations are imposed on local units to feedback on their 
performance, through monitoring, peer-review and benchmarking. As a result of peer-
review of implementation experiences, the benchmarking of best practices is particularly 
important as it provides the basis for mutual learning and accountability.26 Finally, as a 
result of this feedback loop, framework goals and decision-making practices are periodically 
re-evaluated, and, if necessary, revised.27  
There is no universal model for experimentalist governance, but for a global 
experimentalist governance framework to be effective, it is generally thought that four 
preconditions must also be fulfilled. First, governments must be unable to agree on a 
comprehensive set of rules and efficiently monitor their compliance. This is a recurrent 
factor when central actors cannot easily foresee the local effects of rules, and when effective 
rules are subject to unforeseeable change. This condition is a challenge in climate change 
governance, where uncertainty and risks, including with respect to distributive impact, 
combines with a decentralized decision-making.28 This is even more striking with respect to 
the governance of emerging technologies, where the predictability of regulation and its 
effects are frequently challenged by the need for constant update and revision, in the light of 
the fast pace of technological development.29 This can lead to the problem of ‘regulatory 
disconnection’ between law and emerging technologies, which occurs where there is a 
‘mismatch between the regulation-in-the-books and the latest technology in action’, as the 
technology emerges, circulates and evolves before regulators are able to reach an agreed 
position, finalize the terms of the regulation or adapt existing regulations.30  Technology 
then repeatedly leaves the law behind, and often operates in contingent regulatory voids. 
Second, although they are unable to agree on specific rules, governments must not 
disagree on basic principles, to allow discussion and deliberation on the goals and 
benchmarks.31 Rather than a call for universal agreement, this condition requires a thin 
consensus. With respect to global climate governance, the fulfillment of this condition is 
less obvious. As polarized positions among actors persist, they are possibly combined with a 
thin, high level convergence towards the scale of the problem and the urgency of a new 
international climate agreement.32 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  
has played a primary, and yet much criticized, function in thickening such consensus based 
on claims of objective, expert knowledge.33  
Third, cooperation among decision-makers is pivotal, as experimentalist governance 
will not effectively thrive where (formal and informal) veto powers or obstructionism are 
exercised to block consensus and push forward hidden agendas and strategic interests. To 
                                                 
26 DM Trubek and LG Trubek, ‘New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ 
(2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 539, 551. 
27de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20) argue that, when all these five elements operate together, they constitute ‘a form of 
governance that fosters a normatively desirable form of deliberative and participatory problem-solving’ (‘ideal type’)’, but 
hybrid types also represent interesting governance practices. 
28 S Shackley and B Wynne, ‘Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering 
Devices and Authority’ (1996) 21(3) Science, Technology, & Human Values 275; V Heyvaert, ‘Governing Climate Change 
- Towards a New Paradigm for Risk Regulation' (2011) 76(6) The Modern Law Review 817. 
29 GE Marchant, BR Allenby and JR Herkert (eds), The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical 
Oversight (Springer 2011). 
30 R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008) 165. 
31 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 484.  
32 see Stevenson and Dryzek (n 1) (analysing a constellation of discording climate discourses). On the possible convergence, 
L Rajamani, ‘The Warsaw Climate Negotiations: Emerging Understandings and Battle Lines on the Road to the 2015 
Climate Agreement’ (2014) 63(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 721. 
33 For a review of the debate, M Hulme and M Mahoney, ‘Climate Change: What Do We Know About the IPCC?’ (2010) 
34(5) Progress in Physical Geography 705. See also S Jasanoff, ‘A New Climate for Society’, Theory, Culture & Society 
(2010) 27(2–3) 233. 
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drive such cooperation, this model relies upon destabilization mechanisms, such as ‘penalty 
defaults’, established by the central authority as a disincentive for refusal to joining the 
proposed governance system. These are mechanisms for ‘unblocking impasses in 
framework rules-making and revision by rendering the current situation untenable, while 
suggesting – or causing parties to suggest- plausible and superior alternatives’.34 They are 
structured by imposing unfavorable default rules to push parties to cooperate by contributing 
to the information-sharing regime in order to avoid such rules.35 At an international level, 
there are examples of these mechanisms being established, especially in international trade, 
to induce environmentally-oriented collaboration. 36 In global climate governance, where 
multi-actor cooperation is highly problematic, mostly due to political and economic 
interests, the threat of penalty defaults is potentially very powerful. The EU has, 
controversially, started to act in this direction by using (the threat of) unilateral action to 
catalyze adequate international or third countries climate regulation, through the contingent 
imposition of the rules governing the EU Emission Trading Scheme to emissions of 
greenhouse gases generated abroad.37  
Finally, non-state actors (e.g. industry, the scientific community, consumers and 
NGOs) play an increasingly influential role in global governance.38 As a result, to fill the 
information gaps in areas of uncertainty and provide a form of legitimacy through the 
involvement of different interests, a key role is attributed to participation of civil society. 
Compared to other global environmental issues, climate change has certainly engaged a 
wider range of actors, including NGOs and epistemic community. 39 But cooperation with, 
and participation of, civil society and NGOs at an international level is not straightforward, 
due to – inter alia- their legal status under international law, the debate on the democratic 
legitimacy of their participation, and the challenge of identifying the relevant public(s).40  
Although experimentalist governance is far from a panacea, it has clear advantages. 
First, the focus on iterative processes based upon open-ended goals, benchmarking of best 
practices, reporting and periodical review allows decision-making to be based on much 
richer knowledge and information about alternatives than is traditionally available. This 
emphasizes cooperation between different actors and learning as a way to support 
accountability and transparency. As a result, some see experimentalist governance as a way 
to routinize dynamic accountability and transparency.41Second, experimentalist governance 
pursues deliberative participation in decision-making, where ‘actors’ initial preferences are 
                                                 
34 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 22) 176. 
35 The idea of ‘penalty defaults’ originates from contract law to mean penalties ‘designed to give at least one party to the 
contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they 
prefer. [They] are purposefully set at what the parties would not want in order to encourage the parties to reveal information 
to each other or to third parties (especially the courts)’. I Ayers and R Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989) 99(1) The Yale Law Journal 86. For a discussion of penalty defaults in 
experimentalist governance, BC Karkkainen, ‘Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance’ in de Búrca 
and Scott (n 19) 293. 
36 RW Parker, ‘The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-
Dolphin Conflict’ (1999) 12(1) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1. 
37 J Scott and L Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 23 (2) European Journal of International Law 469. 
38 S Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’ (1997) 18 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 183; A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007). 
39 D Tolbert, ‘Global Climate Change and International Non-Governmental Organizations’ in R Churchill and D Freestone 
(eds) International Law and Global Climate Change: International Legal Issues and Implications, (Graham & Trotman 
1991) 95; C Gough and S Shackley, ‘The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The Epistemic Communities and NGOs’ 
(2001) 77 (2) International Affairs 329. 
40 S Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernamental Organizations and International Law’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International 
Law 348. 
41 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17) 12 define ‘dynamic accountability’ as the ‘accountability that anticipates the transformation of 
rules in use’. 
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transformed through discussion by the force of the better argument’.42  In this context, de 
Búrca, Keohane, Sabel argue that ‘we should often establish processes that help us generate 
unimagined alternatives and improve our ability to choose among these alternatives by 
rigorously exposing each to criticism in light of the others’.43 As explained later in the 
context of emerging climate change technologies, achieving deliberative participation is 
problematic as opportunities for upstream, substantive, participation are often limited, 
especially in international fora.44 This also brings up the issue of deference toward scientific 
expertise at the expenses of non-scientific inputs from the lay public in the decision-making 
process, affecting the legitimacy of its outcome. 45  Finally, global experimentalist 
governance may have the merit of catalyzing innovation in international law practices and 
processes. Its constructive engagement with strategic uncertainty and polyarchic distribution 
of power allows the decision-making process to remain flexible and adaptable to changing 
circumstances and new practices towards effective and innovative regulation and 
institutions.  As noted by Cottrell and Trubek, this approach suggests a transformative view 
of international law, which goes beyond a merely legalist vision of international law, as a 
rigid system of precise and enforceable rules, to unleash its expanded problem-solving 
potential.46 
De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel note that ‘[t]he concept of experimentalist governance is 
more demanding than the broader category of pluralistic governance processes […]’.47 The 
main difference lies in its ability to regularize pluralist practices that mostly emerge 
spontaneously and are undertaken on an ad hoc basis. While pluralist modes of governance 
run mostly in parallel with hierarchical international regimes, experimentalist governance 
constructively engages with them, using some of their features and procedures in a recursive 
and participatory fashion.48 In so doing, experimentalist practices can get the best from both 
experiences: on the one hand, they do not reject legally binding norms, but use them as 
penalty defaults, which are characteristic of traditional modes of governance; on the other 
hand, they institutionalise ad hoc forms of decentralisation, consultation, discretion and 
cooperation, which are key features of transnational networks and regime complex.  
 
III. AN EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
The debate on experimentalist governance has flourished in the US and EU social science 
and legal doctrine since the 1990s. 49  Its resonance is now increasingly evident in 
international law and politics. In environmental policy, examples of global experimentalist 
governance have been identified most notably in forestry initiatives, the international 
agreement for the protection of dolphins against tuna fishing practices and the Montreal 
                                                 
42 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 23).  
43 de Búrca, Keohane, Sabel (n 3) 484. 
44 M Lee et al, ‘Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure’ (2013) 25(1) Journal of Environmental Law 33 
(analysing this issue with respect to the consenting process for a nationally significant wind energy or carbon capture and 
storage infrastructure project in England). 
45 On democratization of science in global risk decision-making and governance, J Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in 
International Law (CUP 2010). 
46 Cottrell and Trubek (n 4).  
47 de Búrca, Keohane and  Sabel  (n 20) 17.  
48 BC Karkkainen, ‘“New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous 
Lumping- Reply’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471. 
49 eg MC Dorf and CF Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 (2) Columbia Law Review 267; de 
Búrca and Scott (n 19). 
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Protocol to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer.50 But, in the 
context of climate change, experimentalist practices remain largely unexplored.51  This is 
surprising as climate change has increasingly become a crucial global governance issue, 
which presents linkages with the paradigm of strategies uncertainty and polyarchic 
distribution of power, constituting the scope conditions for experimentalist governance.  
On the one hand, climate change is seen as a wicked problem: that is a problem whose 
solutions cannot readily be found in existing mechanisms and which persists even after the 
application of the best-available practices.52  Von Homeyer refers to climate change as a 
‘persistent environmental problem’ that could drive the emergence of experimentalist 
governance, based on relatively close links between the problem and the operating logic of 
the economic sectors causing it; high complexity; low visibility and a global dimension.53 
These characteristics point towards the experimentalist idea of strategic uncertainty, where 
traditional problem-solving strategies fail.54 
On the other hand, climate change certainly constitutes a collective action problem. In 
Cole’s definition, this is ‘one that cannot be solved by a single individual or member of a 
group, but requires the cooperation of others who often have disparate interests and 
incentives, raising the costs of transacting or negotiating a cooperative solution.’55 In an 
experimentalist governance context, this could be framed as a question of ‘polyarchic 
distribution of power’, where no actor is able to operate in isolation, nor impose its preferred 
solution, without cooperating with others. Under this reading then, experimentalist 
experiences could make a valuable contribution to climate change governance, providing a 
new framework for dealing with the failure of traditional problem-solving strategies and 
multilevel cooperation in decision-making.   
This paradigm of uncertainty and distribution of decision-making power is 
particularly relevant when it comes to the governance of climate change technologies. Over 
the last decade, these issues have increasingly been debated with respect to the potential 
governance of geoengineering research. While mechanisms are in place for dealing with 
some aspects of their potential control (e.g. environmental impact assessment), these 
techniques present huge challenges, raising the recurrent question of how to deal with 
uncertainties, risks and asymmetric distribution of impact across regions and communities, 
while ensuring effective participation, accountability, transparency and regulatory flexibility. 
IV. GEOENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES: RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES  
 
Geoengineering methods are generally divided into two categories: Carbon Dioxide Removal 
(CDR) and Solar Radiation Management (SRM) techniques.56 CDR techniques ‘address the 
                                                 
50 C Overdevest and J Zeitlin, ‘Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest 
Sector’ (2014) 8(1) Regulation & Governance 22; de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20). 
51 Among the few scholars developing this perspective, J Scott, ‘The MuIti-Level Governance of Climate Change’ in P Craig 
and G de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 2012); I von Homeyer, ‘Emerging Experimentalism in EU 
Environmental Governance’ in C Sabel and J Zeitlin  (n 17). 
52 H Rittel and M Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, (1973) 4 Policy Sciences 155 (first introducing the 
concept of ‘wicked’, as opposed to ‘tame’, problems). On the link with climate change, RJ Lazarus, ‘Super Wicked 
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future’, (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 1153; K 
Levin et al, ‘Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global 
Climate Change’ (2012) 45 Policy Sciences 123.  
53 I von Homeyer, ‘Emerging Experimentalism in EU Environmental Governance’ in Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17) 121,127. 
54 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 22) 179; De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel (n 3) 477. 
55 DH Cole, ‘Climate and Collective Action’ (2008) 61 (1) Current Legal Problems 229, 232. 
56 B Lauden and JMT Thompson (eds), Geoengineering Climate Change – Environmental Necessity or Pandora’s Box? 
(CUP 2010). See also N E Vaughan and TM Lenton, ‘A Review of Climate Geoengineering Proposals’ (2011) 109 Climatic 
Change 745.  
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root cause of climate change by removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere’.57 These 
include land-based methods, such as afforestation, reforestation, or direct air capture; as well 
as ocean-based methods, such as ocean iron fertilization. The latter aims at increasing the rate 
of CO2 transfer into the deep sea by manipulating the ocean carbon cycle through addition of 
nutrients, such as iron.58 SRM techniques, instead, ‘attempt to offset the effects of increased 
greenhouse gas concentrations by causing the Earth to absorb less solar radiation’.59 These 
refer to a series of untested methods that would increase the reflectivity of the Earth by 
making its surface brighter; cool the Earth through injection of cloud-condensing particles 
into the atmosphere; scatter sunlight back to space, through injection of sulphate aerosols into 
the stratosphere; or reflect solar radiation by positioning sun-shields into space. Most of these 
techniques are merely technological concepts and are not even at the stage of development, as 
‘much more research on the feasibility, effectiveness, cost, social and environmental impacts 
and possible unintended consequences is required to understand the potential benefits and 
drawbacks, before these methods can be properly evaluated’.60  
However, all these methods assume that we can successfully manipulate the climate 
to counteract dangerous climate change, and present significant risks and uncertainties.61 
Ocean fertilization, for instance, is likely to increase ocean acidification and lead to 
ecosystem shifts and loss. 62 This would result in huge distributive impacts, especially upon 
those communities relying on traditional uses of marine resources for their livelihood. 63 
SRM might adversely change and reduce the precipitation pathways, disrupting large scale 
food production,64causing droughts and water resources scarcity.65 The ultimate effects of 
SRM and some CDR, such as ocean fertilization, remain largely unknown and 
unpredictable, as we remain ignorant of some of the potential impacts, including with 
respect to the scale and consequences of the ‘rebound effect’. This refers to the 
circumstance by which, upon cessation of geoengineering, the climate would warm more 
rapidly than if no geoengineering had been conducted, making the impact of climate change 
much more disruptive than what we experience now. 66   These techniques are also 
characterized by uncertainties with respect to their potential effectiveness. According to the 
IPCC, the ability of CDR techniques to control the climate system is likely to be limited, as 
there is insufficient knowledge to calculate how much CO2 could be offset by these 
techniques on a century timescale. 67 While SRM methods, if realizable, have the potential 
to substantially offset a global temperature rise, they would also modify the global water 
cycle, and would not reduce ocean acidification.68 The insufficient knowledge about the 
                                                 
57 Royal Society (n 7).  
58 see IMO, Report of the First Meeting of the Intersessional Technical Working Group on Ocean Fertilization (LC/SG-CO2 
3/5), 16 February 2009.  
59 Royal Society (n 7). 
60 ibid. xii. 
61 D Humphreys, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: Some Reflections on the Science and Politics of Geoengineering’ (2011) 20(2) The 
Journal of Environment and Development 99. 
62 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Fertilization on 
Marine Biodiversity’, Montreal, Technical Series No 45 (2009); BD Russell and SD Connell, ‘Honing the Geoengineering 
Strategy’, Science (8 January 2010) 144. 
63 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Geoengineering in Relation to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: Technical and Regulatory Matters, Montreal, Technical Series No 66 (2012) 74. 
64  A Robock et al, ‘A Test for Geoengineering?’ Science (29 January 2010) 530; A Robock, ‘20 Reasons Why 
Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea’ (2008) 64(2) Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 14. 
65 GC Hegerl and S Solomon, ‘Risks of Climate Engineering’, Science (21 August 2009) 955. 
66 A Robock, et al (n 64). 
67 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis - Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - Summary for Policymakers (CUP 2013) 27. 
68 ibid. 
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potentially huge intended and unintended consequences of these techniques, and their 
probabilities, clearly constitutes a barrier to effective governance and regulation. 69    
These challenges are aggravated by social and ethical concerns, including issues of 
public engagement in, and consent to, a potential geoengineering scenario.70 The side effects 
of these techniques are potentially going to be felt more by the poor, who are more 
vulnerable to climatic changes and less able to commit resources to adapt, raising 
substantive intra- and intergenerational equity dilemmas.71 This makes the question of social 
consent and participation in the decision-making even more urgent, and yet problematic. 
Whose consent is necessary when it comes to manipulating the global climate? How can we 
control the eventuality of unilateral action by States, or individuals outside government 
oversight, on climate geoengineering, and reduce the risk of global conflicts and security 
threats? 72 These are all questions that should be addressed by allowing upstream public 
participation in the decision-making process.73 
 These risks and uncertainties expose the decision-making about these technologies 
to Collingridge’s “control dilemma”. This claims that until a technology is sufficiently 
developed, its impacts cannot be sufficiently understood in order to assess, regulate and 
control its deployment; but, at the same time, early regulation is necessary to control 
technological development and avoid negative impacts.74 In a geoengineering context, this 
impasse is unavoidable. As most of these techniques are still in a conceptual stage, more 
research is needed to reduce risks and uncertainties, as a fundamental step to design effective 
governance and regulation. At the same time, ‘global, transparent and effective control and 
regulatory mechanisms’ are increasingly viewed as a pre-condition for any geoengineering 
research activity.75  
While an unconditional prohibition is probably undesirable, international governance 
mechanisms are crucial to control and manage unintended, potentially dangerous, effects 
and the risk of unilateral action. 76 As existing international treaties and rules were not 
conceived with this technology in mind, they do not provide direct control of 
geoengineering techniques, nor bespoke mechanism to ensure participation, flexibility and 
transparency for the governance of these techniques. Although this is not to suggest that 
potential geoengineering activities would emerge in a legal vacuum, as customary 
international law principles would still apply, experimentalist governance theories could 
contribute to support and redirect international law towards effective governance of 
geoengineering research.  
 
                                                 
69 ibid. See also Royal Society (n 7) 38. 
70 N Pidgeon and A Corner, ‘Geoengineering the Climate: the Social and Ethical Implications’ (2010) 52(1) Environment: 
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 24. 
71 SM Gardiner, ‘Is “Arming the Future” with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?: Some Doubts About the Ethics of 
Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System’ in S Gardiner et al (eds), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (OUP 2010) 
284. 
72 DG Victor, ‘On the regulation of geoengineering’ (2008) 24 (2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 322 (arguing that the 
threat of unilateral action makes existing international norms ineffective). Cf J Horton, ‘Geoengineering and the Myth of 
Unilateralism: Pressures and Prospects for International Cooperation’ (2011) 4 Stanford Journal of Law Science and Policy 
56 (noting that the fear of unilateral action is misplaced). 
73 Pidgeon and Corner (n 70). 
74 D Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Bloomsbury Publishing PLC 1982). 
75 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) COP Decision IX/16 (2008) C para 4; CBD COP Decision X/33 (2010) para 8 
(w). These decisions were endorsed in IMO Resolution LC/LP. 1 (2008) on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, 31 
October 2008. See also EA Parson and D Keith, ‘End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research’ Science 
(13 March 2013) 339; S Rayner et al, Memorandum on draft principles for the conduct of geoengineering research. House 
of Commons Science and Technology Committee Enquiry into the Regulation of Geoengineering (2009).  
76 D Victor, Global Warming Gridlock – Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (CUP 2011) 193.  
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V. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POTENTIAL FOR 
EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN GEOENGINEERING 
RESEARCH 
 
The relationship between law and governance is unavoidably complex. 77 De Búrca and Scott 
have described such interaction based on three models. 78 In some instances law resists and 
inhibits governance, or is confronted with a general reduction of its capacity (‘gap thesis’). In 
others, they are ‘mutually interdependent and mutually sustaining’, mainly through the 
interaction of soft and hard law (‘hybridity thesis’). But there are also examples where both 
governance and law are reshaped and transformed, as a result of their reciprocal interaction 
(‘transformation thesis’). Yet, governance practices appear to always question the role of law 
in its ability to reflectively adapt to uncertainty, changing circumstances and multipolar actor 
dynamics.79 By conceiving a global experimentalist governance approach to the international 
regulation of geoengineering research, the relationship between governance and law might 
principally be viewed as transformative.  
As most geoengineering techniques are largely untested and pervaded with 
unknowns, the debate on their governance and regulation remains mostly speculative. 
However, norms and institutions that can potentially control field-experiments and small-
scale research are being analyzed. Domestic law and institutions would theoretically have 
the capacity to control encapsulated techniques through existing regulatory tools, such as 
existing environmental and planning law mechanisms within their jurisdiction. 80  However, 
they show a limited ability to address unencapsulated methods, entailing a higher probability 
of transboundary effects or impact upon areas beyond national jurisdiction, which require 
international control. 
With respect to their international regulation, there is no international treaty specific 
enough, nor international institution with a sufficiently clear mandate, to provide a direct 
governance and regulatory framework for all geoengineering methods or all aspects of 
individual methods. As a result, there is virtually no dedicated transnational control on 
climate engineering research or, potentially, large-scale deployment. This means that, as a 
matter of international law, ‘[a]ny State may legally conduct [geoengineering], on or over its 
own territory, or that of other consenting states, or over the high seas’. 81   
However, this apparently permissive approach is limited by customary law principles 
of general application originated by State practice.82 Here, the no harm principle, the duty to 
consult and notify of potential transboundary harm, and the obligation to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment are of specific interest. 83  First, the ‘no harm’ principle 
                                                 
77 See the ‘quarrel’ between Lobel and Karkkainen on new governance and the role of law. O Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The 
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 324; BC 
Karkkainen (n 48); O Lobel, ‘Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research- Surreply’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law 
Review 498. 
78  de Búrca and Scott (n 19) 4-10. 
79 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20); J Cohen and C Sabel, ‘Directly-Deliberative-Poliarchy’ (1997) 3(4) European Law 
Journal 313.  
80 “Encapsulation” refers to whether the method is modular and contained, such as is the case with air capture and space 
reflectors, or whether it involves material released into the wider environment, as is the case with sulphate aerosols or ocean 
fertilisation (Royal Society (n 7) 38). 
81 EA Parson, ‘Climate Engineering in Global Climate Governance: Implications for Participation and Linkages’ (2014) 
3(1)Transnational Environmental Law 89, 95.  
82 See, in general, N. De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002).  
83 For a comprehensive analysis of the customary international law principles applicable to geoengineering, KN Scott, 
‘International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 309. 
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imposes an obligation on States to prevent, reduce and control pollution and significant 
transboundary environmental harm to the territory of other States or to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction arising from activities within their jurisdiction and control.  This principle has 
been enunciated in soft law declarations,84 endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the 
International Law Commission,85 recognized in important judicial decisions,86 and codified in 
most environmental law treaties through more specific treaty obligations, such as the 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment or to conserve biological 
diversity. 87  Fulfilling these obligations is likely to be problematic with respect to some 
geoengineering technologies. As this principle primarily operates in relation to shared natural 
resources and hazardous activities, the extent to which geoengineering techniques would 
affect shared natural resources and/or constitute hazardous activities will need to be clarified. 
Moreover the principle not only includes activities conducted within the territory of a State, 
but also under its jurisdiction and control, thus including State’s flagged vessels and 
registered aircrafts wherever they may be. This clearly extends its applicability to most 
geoengineering-related activities, including unencapsulated methods.88 
Second, the obligation to consult and notify of potential transboundary harm, as well 
as, to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) will apply to geoengineering 
activities presenting a risk of ‘significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in 
particular, on a shared resource’.89 Although the scope and content of the assessment is to be 
determined by national law through the establishment of a national procedure for the ex-ante 
and regular assessment of the impact, international law requires consideration of the ‘nature 
and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the 
environment’, 90 as well as the inclusion of ‘the effects of the activity not only on persons and 
property, but also on the environment of other States’. 91  The discretion left to national 
authorities in establishing the procedure is subject to the exercise of due diligence, in the 
absence of general international rules or specific treaty provisions.92 In this context, treaty 
assessment frameworks, such as the one established for scientific research on ocean iron 
fertilization under the London Protocol - which I analyse below - can ‘play an important role 
in ensuring both harmonization of national measures and the application of appropriate 
                                                 
84 1972 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm) UN Doc A/CONF/48/14 REV.1, 
Principle 21; 1992 Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro) UN  
Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, Report of the UNCED,Vol.1 (New York), Principle 2. 
85 eg Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res 3281, UN GAOR, 29th Sess Supp No 31, UN Doc 
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Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities)’ in ILC, ‘Report 
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly covering the work of its fifty-third session, with 
commentaries, 2001’ (UN Doc A/56/10), Ch V, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol II, Part Two 
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86 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons) para 29 (stating that this obligation is ‘now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment); 
Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14 (Pulp Mills) para 101. 
87 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) 21 ILM (1982) 1261. In force 16 November 1994 (‘LOSC’) arts 
192-5; Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro) 31 ILM (1992) (‘CBD’) art 3. 
88 See C Armeni and C Redgwell,  ‘International Legal and Regulatory Issues of Climate Geoengineering Governance: 
Rethinking the Approach’ (2015) Climate Geoengineering Governance Working Paper no 21/2015 <http://geoengineering-
governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper21armeniredgwelltheinternationalcontext-2.pdf>. 
89  Pulp Mills (n 86), para 204. This obligation can also be also found in the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context  (Espoo) 30 ILM (1991) 801. In force 27 June 1997. Art 2(1). 
90 Ibid. para 205. 
91 Draft Articles on Prevention (n 85) Commentary to art 7. 
92 Pulp Mills, (n 86) para 197 (defining the obligation of due diligence as entailing ‘the adoption of appropriate rules and 
measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to 
public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the 
other party.’) 
 13 
standards and thresholds for assessment of geoengineering activities’.93 These obligations 
however do not entail a duty to obtain the consent of neighboring States to the activity, as 
they do not provide them with a veto power over the conduct of the activity. 
Against the backdrop of customary international law rules and soft-law principles 
(e.g. the precautionary principle), most of the international law literature has focused on how 
these techniques, particularly ocean fertilization and sulphate aerosol injection, could - 
directly and indirectly - be governed by existing international treaties and institutions.94 This 
assessment has been based on their subject matter or mandate (e.g. climate change, 
protection of biological diversity, environmental modification techniques), geographic scope 
and impact (e.g. marine environment, atmosphere, outer space) and regulated substances 
(e.g. ozone depleting substances). It has then become clear that, in most cases, adjustments 
were needed to effectively regulate these techniques.95  
Although existing international law is a necessary starting point, this approach risks 
underestimating the fundamental question of how decisions about these technologies should 
be made and who might legitimately make them.96 In other words, the broader governance 
question about the legitimate forms and actors of the decision-making on these techniques 
becomes an afterthought. Using an experimentalist paradigm, these might be described as 
questions surrounding the ways to deal with strategic uncertainties related to successful 
problem-solving techniques, and polyarchic distribution of power across a multitude of 
States and non-state actors legitimately involved in the decision-making process.  
Here, existing international law instruments appear ill-suited to answer these 
questions in isolation. This is because potentially applicable international treaties have not 
been conceived with geoengineering in mind, and could therefore merely perform a default, 
simply passive function with respect to the governance of these technologies, until and 
unless specific amendments are actively adopted. As it stands, potentially applicable 
international treaties are not flexible enough to take strategic uncertainties into account, nor 
reflect the multilevel distribution of power that we experience in this area. Moreover there is 
a concrete possibility of regulatory disconnection in geoengineering. Like with other 
technological developments (e.g. biotechnology, information technologies), the technology 
here might develop faster than its regulatory framework, reducing international law to a 
merely reactive function and requiring constant re-adjustment to new scientific and 
technological development.97  These factors make most existing international treaties ill-
equipped to constitute an effective governance framework for geoengineering, in the absence 
of specific mechanisms for building flexibility and adaptability. 98  More flexibility, 
collaborative participation and adaptability should be built into their framework to 
                                                 
93 Armeni and Redgwell (n 88) 37. 
94 eg Redgwell  (n 10); Scott (n 83); J Reynolds, ‘The Regulation of Climate Engineering’ (2011) 3 Law, Innovation and 
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Gap between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The Pacing Problem (Springer 2011);  
98 As examples of specific adjustment mechanisms, see: Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena) 39 ILM (2000). In 
force 11 September 2003; ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
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adequately reflect uncertainties, involve actors at different levels of decision-making and 
ensure that regulation constantly connects with its regulatory target. Some have already 
started suggesting alternative paradigms to international treaties, focusing on the potential 
for regional collaborations, adaptive management and a stronger reliance on soft law 
mechanisms and bottom-up initiatives for governing geoengineering research.99 
On this basis, I argue that lessons from experimentalist governance could help 
transform and redirect international law instruments towards a more adaptive and proactive 
approach to governing these technologies. An iterative reflection on the mechanisms for 
decision-making and participation, based on provisional goals, recursive learning and 
cooperation could enable a more effective governance framework. This might also allow the 
regulatory process to be more responsive to changes and therefore reduce the potential for 
regulatory disconnection between law and technology.  Furthermore, as Cottrell and Trubek 
convincingly argue with respect to new governance-type mechanisms within transnational 
regulatory contexts (i.e. WTO and EU), the recourse to open-ended standards, benchmarking 
of best practices, deliberation and negotiation, networks for coordinating multiple levels of 
governance, and the use of soft and hard law suggests an ‘expanded vision’ of international 
law as a framework for problem-solving, to deal with strategic uncertainty and multilevel 
distribution of power.100  
Certainly, this is not to suggest that the existing international law rules and 
institutions are irrelevant. On the contrary, international law provides indirect legal 
constraints on States’ conduct associated with geoengineering through customary 
international law and any treaty provisions potentially applicable, or at least adaptable, to 
individual activities or their effects. It therefore serves an essential backstop function in 
constraining behavior and restraining unilateral action; helping structure international and 
national discussion; and directing geoengineering governance to specific international 
institutions.101   As a result, international law provides the necessary context for global 
governance practices to emerge.  Experimentalist governance structures cannot thrive in 
isolation, but will need to interact with, and rely upon, existing international law and 
institutions, with the result of eventually being influenced by these rules and processes. But 
using an experimentalist model for geoengineering governance would not be 
straightforward. As discussed later, its practical implementation within the new international 
marine geoengineering governance framework under the London Protocol remains difficult, 
due the barriers to cooperation and public participation. 
VI. MARINE GEOENGINEERING UNDER THE LONDON PROTOCOL ON 
DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTER AT SEA 
 
Among the variety of geoengineering concepts, ocean fertilization has received greatest 
attention in the international legal literature.102  This is due of its alleged technical viability 
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and the fact that some small-scale experiments concerning ocean fertilization have already 
taken place, steering the debate on their effective international regulation and control.103Here 
I analyse the 2013 marine geoengineering amendments to the Protocol to the London 
Convention on Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea. Subject to its entry into force, 
these would constitute the first internationally binding control mechanism for marine 
geoengineering activities.104 
The London Convention regime’s objective is to promote effective control of all 
sources of pollution of the marine environment, by preventing, reducing and, where practical, 
eliminating dumping of wastes and other matters at sea.105  Dumping is defined as ‘any 
deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from (and of) vessels, aircrafts, platforms 
or other man-made structures at sea’ and is prohibited under this regime.106 Placement of 
wastes for the purpose other than disposal is not considered dumping, and is permitted, 
insofar as this is not contrary to the aims of the Convention. The London Protocol (LP), 
which is intended to replace the Convention for Parties who have ratified it, applies a 
restrictive, ‘prohibited unless permitted’ approach to dumping, based on the precautionary 
principle.107   
Parties started addressing marine geoengineering in 2007, issuing a Statement of 
Concern with respect to ocean fertilization experiments. 108  In line with a non-binding 
decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD),109 in 2008 they adopted a non-binding resolution, clarifying that ocean fertilization 
activities were not to be allowed as these would violate the aims of the Convention and 
Protocol, and qualify as dumping. 110  However, ‘legitimate scientific research’ on ocean 
fertilization was considered ‘placement for a purpose other than disposal’, and therefore 
permitted, subject to a national permit and provided that it is not contrary to the aims of the 
Convention and Protocol. 111 Legitimate scientific research was defined as ‘those proposals 
that have been assessed and found acceptable under the assessment framework’, on a case-
by-case basis.112 Ocean fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific research were 
not to be allowed.113 In 2010, a Specific Assessment Framework for Scientific Research 
(AFSR) involving Ocean Fertilization was adopted to guide the evaluation of ‘legitimate 
                                                                                                                                                       
Climate Law Review 477; R Rayfuse and R Warner, ‘Climate Change Mitigation Activities in the Ocean: Turning Up the 
Regulatory Heat’ in R Warner and C Schofield (eds), Climate Change and The Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy 
Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond, (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012), KN Scott, ‘Regulating Ocean Fertilization under 
International Law: The Risk’ (2013) 2 Carbon Climate Law Review 108.  
103 R Rayfuse, ‘Drowning Our Sorrows to Create a Carbon Free Future? Some International Legal Considerations Relating 
to Sequestering Carbon by Fertilizing the Oceans’ (2008) 14(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal Forum 54. N 
Craik, J Blackstock and AM Hubert, ‘Regulating Geoengineering Research through Domestic Environmental Protection 
Frameworks: Reflections on the Recent Canadian Ocean Fertilization Case’ (2013) 2 Carbon and Climate Law Review 117.  
104 The amendment will enter into force for those Parties which have accepted it on the 60th day after two-third of the Parties 
that have deposited their instrument of acceptance with the International Maritime Organization (art 21. (3) (The US is not a 
Party to the Protocol).  
105 LC, arts I and II and LP, art 2.  
106 LC, art III (1) (b) (ii) and LP, art 1.4.1.1. Under the LP, dumping also includes ‘any storage of wastes or other matter in 
the seabed  and the subsoil thereof from vessels, aircraft and platforms or other man-made statures at sea and any abandoned 
or toppling at side of platforms or other man-made structures at sea for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal. (LP, art 1 
(4(3) and  (4)). 
107 LP, art 3. 
108 IMO, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, 1972 and its 
1996 Protocol, Statement of Concern Regarding Iron Fertilization of the Oceans to Sequester CO2 (LC-LP.1/Circ.14, 13 July 
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scientific research’.114 This constitutes an iterative process to support national authorities in 
issuing the permit, intended to be reviewed at appropriate intervals, in light of new and 
relevant scientific knowledge and experience in applying the framework’.115 Finally, in 2013 
the Parties translated these non-binding resolutions into binding amendments to the Protocol 
to regulate marine geoengineering activities.116 This has been presented as ‘a mark of true 
leadership in global standard-setting’.117 
 ‘Marine geoengineering’ is defined under the amendments as ‘a deliberate 
intervention in the marine environment to manipulate natural processes, including to 
counteract anthropogenic climate change and/or its impacts, and that has the potential to 
result in deleterious effects, especially where those effects may be widespread, long-lasting 
or severe’.118 Based on this definition, a new article 6bis states that ‘Contracting Parties shall 
not allow the placement of matter into the sea from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-
made structures at sea for marine geoengineering activities listed in Annex 4, unless the 
listing provides that the activity or the sub-category of an activity may be authorized under a 
permit’.119  Ocean fertilization is the only type of marine geoengineering currently listed 
under a new Annex 4, which states that ‘ocean iron fertilization may only be considered for a 
permit if it is assessed as constituting legitimate scientific research taking into account any 
specific placement assessment framework’ (i.e. AFSR for ocean iron fertilization). 120  A 
binding Generic Assessment Framework established in a new Annex 5 is to guide the 
evaluation of ‘matters that might be considered for placement under Annex 4’.121 In the case 
of ocean iron fertilization, this Generic Framework is to be complemented with the Specific 
Assessment Framework for Scientific Research (AFSR) involving Ocean Iron Fertilization, 
which ‘shall meet the requirements of [Annex 5] and may provide further guidance for 
assessing and issuing permits’.122 
Other marine geoengineering activities could be included in Annex 4 in the future, 
based on a ‘recommended non-binding procedure’.123 This process enables the Protocol to 
remain flexible and adaptable to future developments in this field, while ensuring that the 
primary objective to protect the marine environment is pursued, in the light of the 
precautionary principle. Contextually, a procedure for the appointment of international 
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independent experts was adopted. They should provide advice on listed activities or 
consideration for listing, under the oversight of the Secretariat, and can be nominated by both 
Parties and observers (e.g. NGOs). While the initial proposal envisaged a standing body, the 
final agreement was to appoint a roster of experts leaving discretion to the Parties as to when 
and how to seek their advice.124  
Should these amendments enter into force, Parties would need to adapt their national 
permitting system to ocean fertilization research activities. For instance, an iron fertilization 
activity, when conducted in the UK marine areas (although unlikely), or anywhere in the sea 
from a British vessel or a vessel loaded in the UK, would constitute a licensable activity 
under the Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009) and the Marine (Scotland) Act (2010). 125 
However, as of March 2015, no ratification has yet been notified to the IMO Secretariat. 
Some predict a period between five and ten years for it to come into force, during which the 
non-binding 2008 and 2010 resolutions will still apply, including the specific AFSR.126 
However, subject to its entry into force, this amendment could drive controlled marine 
geoengineering research and provide initial governance for these activities.  
VII. A CASE FOR EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE TECHNOLOGIES? 
 
The new regime for marine geoengineering research under the LP represents a significant 
development in international environmental law. It combines a positive attitude towards 
scientific research and multilevel cooperation, with a desire to accommodate the regulatory 
disconnection between law and technology. These amendments reflect a number of features 
of experimentalist governance. This connection however remains loose as some 
fundamental barriers remain for them to embody an ideal type of this mode of governance. 
In section II, I outlined four deliberation-fostering elements. As set out above these elements 
are: provisional framework goals, and metrics for evaluation; implementation by ‘lower 
level’ units; regular reporting and peer-review obligations; and periodical re-evaluation and 
review of the goals and decision-making practices. These aspects of experimentalist 
governance are, at least loosely, reflected in the rationale of the amendments and the 
assessment framework(s), and operate within the normative backstop of the rules and 
institutions established under the Protocol.   
First, the amendments’ objective is to ensure that ocean fertilization activities are 
compatible with the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Based on a 
precautionary approach, this objective can be viewed as a provisional framework goal. Its 
scope is open-textured as it broadly relates to the protection of the marine environment, and 
the possible extension of the regulation to other marine geoengineering types suggests that 
its current regulatory target (i.e. ocean fertilization) might be merely provisional.127  This 
approach then provides flexibility by ‘future-proofing’ the Protocol to allow for ‘quick 
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regulatory responses to new techniques’.128 This factor is significant as it directly responds 
to the issue of regulatory disconnection between law and technology. However, such 
flexibility seems pre-framed in favour of technological development, as there is no express 
indication that this objective can be provisional in the sense that a marine geoengineering 
type should be delisted from – rather than added to - the permitted activities, as a result of 
new knowledge. 129  
The Generic Assessment Framework, in combination with the AFSR involving ocean 
iron fertilization, represents the metric to evaluate the implementation of this framework 
goal. This is a central tool of the architecture established under the LP and  is modelled on 
the London Protocol Annex II of Assessment of wastes or other matters that may be 
considered for dumping. This template is to be used by national authorities to judge whether 
the proposed activity amounts to legitimate scientific research, and can therefore be 
permitted, in compliance with the framework goal. The assessment is an iterative process of 
collection of information, peer review, and comparison of data, experiences and monitoring 
methodologies. The evaluation focuses in particular on the scientific questions at the basis 
of the field-experiment; research methodology; and potential conflict with economic 
interests. Project proponents must provide information for the assessment of the placement 
site, substances used, potential effects, risk management and monitoring.  If the project is 
likely to have an impact on another area of the sea or in areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
consultation must be carried out with the State exercising jurisdiction or with any other 
potentially affected State. The consultation should engage with any other stakeholders and 
involve advice from independent international experts.130 
Second, national authorities retain discretion in the implementation of the Protocol’s 
obligations, including with respect to the application of the Generic and Specific 
Assessment Frameworks and other guidelines, and the selection of experts. This amounts to 
an opportunity to contribute to the identification and definition of the problems, through 
different solutions. National authorities are therefore the centre of gravity of the regime as 
they engage with both project proponents and the IMO Secretariat, while retaining clear 
autonomy in decision-making and implementation.  
Third, and strictly linked to lower units’ discretion, an institutionalised dialogue 
between key actors is established through regular reporting and peer-review. National 
decisions and experiences must feed back into the central international process as ‘the 
outcome of any assessment and documentation of any permit issued shall be reported to the 
Secretariat and shall be made publicly available at or shortly after the time the decision is 
made’. 131 This reporting of information on the permitting supports the learning process and 
allows monitoring and peer-review to feed back to the Conference of the Parties, as the 
regime’s ultimate decision-making body, and inform the benchmarking of best practices. In 
connection with this requirement, a web-based repository of references relating to the 
application of the AFSR is being developed, which would be accessible to all LC/LP 
Parties, in cooperation with the CBD, UNESCO-IOC and other forums.132  Although the 
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terms of reference indicated that this will be open to all Parties, there is no indication that 
information will be confidential and that non-Parties or non-state actors, including NGOs, 
would be denied access.133 Although this repository does not amount to an institutional 
clearing-house mechanism, such as the one under the Montreal Protocol’s financial 
mechanism or the  CBD, it is nevertheless important to centralise technical expertise and 
local decision-making practices, and enable exchange of experiences and best practices.134 
This iterative dialogue between project proponents, national authorities and international 
bodies reflects the attention to cooperation between local and central units, as we see in 
democratic experimentalism.135 Following a recursive review of scientific information and 
permitting procedures, data from local units are regularly refined and shared with the 
Secretariat, as the global standard-setter. 
This leads the reporting and peer-review process to finally trigger periodical revision 
and review as part of a reflexive exercise.136 The learning process through the Assessment 
Frameworks and the central reporting could result in adjustments to be required to the 
research proposal, the national permit or the list of activities permitted under the rubric of 
marine geoengineering. This is to ensure that regulation and governance remain flexible and 
adaptable to evolving knowledge, while fulfilling the framework objective of protecting and 
preserving the marine environment. In particular, monitoring and peer-review of data under 
the Generic Framework ‘will indicate whether field programmes need to be continued, 
revised or terminated and will inform decisions regarding the permits’.137 K. Scott stresses 
how this ‘[…] risk assessment framework is a model for precautionary and adaptive 
management, and compares favorably with instruments providing for environmental impact 
assessment such as the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty’. 138  The 
emphasis on the need to regularly review the decision-making regarding marine 
geoengineering has been central to the adoption of the 2014 guidance for revision of 
permitted marine geoengineering activities.139  
At first glance, then, the presence of these elements suggests that we might fairly 
consider the governance regime for ocean iron fertilization as an example of experimentalist 
governance in the international regulation of climate change technologies. However, as also 
discussed in section II, four conditions are generally considered necessary for effective 
experimentalist governance. These are: the inability of governments to agree on a 
comprehensive set of rules and efficiently monitor their compliance; a general agreement on 
basic principles to allow discussion and deliberation on the goals and benchmarks; 
cooperation among decision-makers; and civil society participation. 
The new amendments build on the first two conditions. On the one hand, they are 
limited to an ocean fertilization context as Parties were not able to agree on a ‘one size fits 
all’ governance mechanism for all marine geoengineering techniques. Such an approach 
would have fallen short of addressing the characteristics of each technique and prevented 
effective monitoring of compliance with the regulation. On the other hand, Parties were able 
to agree on a control mechanism for legitimate scientific research, establishing basic 
principles and procedures. The characterization of the main attributes of legitimate scientific 
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research is a central aspect of the framework, and rejoins with other international 
mechanisms for the control of marine scientific research (i.e. LOSC and the 1991 
Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty).140 But, despite these two factors, the 
overall architecture of the international regime for ocean iron fertilization demonstrates a 
limited scope for cooperation between decision-makers, aggravated by the absence of penalty 
defaults, and restricted opportunities for deliberative participation of civil society.  
Cooperation between Parties is a necessary pre-condition for experimentalist 
governance to thrive. 141  But, the space for such cooperation under the LP amendments 
appears narrowly framed, effectively acting as a barrier to experimentalist governance. Here, 
cooperation has taken different routes. With respect to the negotiations of the amendments, 
cooperation among Parties (including non-state actors) has been high, and widely 
encouraged, both in plenaries and in working groups. This is important as, while the Protocol 
enjoys limited participation,142 non-Parties, such as the US, have been active in the debate 
and suggestion of possible options for the amendments.143  
But, with respect to the marine geoengineering framework as operated, cooperation in 
information-sharing essentially occurs between national authorities, project proponents and 
the Secretariat, with the potential support of nationally-designated experts.  As discussed 
further below, there is limited space for external participation. Furthermore, even the scope 
for cooperation between ‘insiders’ appears restricted, as the exchange and learning process 
happens within the confined boundary of the specific proposal under discussion, taking a 
vertical approach to cooperation. Little is done to encourage horizontal cooperation among 
different national authorities and proponents to drive comparability and learning across 
experiences in implementation. Horizontal cooperation between national authorities is not 
uncommon within international environmental law treaties and institutions. Examples range 
from coordination between national Management Authorities under the Convention on 
International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES); through the IMO-supported Memoranda 
of Understanding for Port State Control (PSC) and cooperation under MARPOL, and 
multiple fora for cooperation between national nuclear energy regulators, including in the 
event of nuclear emergencies.144 In this context, then, the lack of specific mechanism to 
encourage such horizontal cooperation under the new marine geoengineering regime appears 
short-sighted, given the potential transboundary, and even global, impact of these activities. 
Even the web-based repository of information under the Secretariat is a rather weak tool, as 
no formal obligation is imposed on Parties to take this information into account to drive 
recursive learning and inform revision of framework objectives and decision-making 
practices.   
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This approach potentially reduces the role of cooperation from a catalyst for learning, 
to a narrow procedural task within the permitting regime. To confirm this point, the new 
regime does not foresee a system of penalty defaults to induce cooperation. As illustrated 
above, experimentalist governance often works in the shadow of penalty defaults, as a threat 
of less favourable default rules to be applied in the event that Parties do not cooperate by 
signing up to a destabilisation regime. This is to encourage collaborative participation into 
the new system, by making alternative rules undesirable and inducing a re-evaluation of the 
benefit of collective action. In a global governance context, penalty defaults have effectively 
been designed as threats of trade sanctions, such as those established to penalise non-
cooperation within the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission to minimise the death of 
dolphin by-catch, or of trade restrictions, such as those applicable to Ozone Depleting 
Substances under the Montreal Protocol regime, or those applied on an ad hoc basis by the 
COP under CITES. 145 But in the case of the LP amendments on marine geoengineering, 
penalty default rules are absent, or at least unclear. While it is true that penalty defaults do 
not constitute a foundational element of experimentalist governance, they represent a 
valuable deterrent to reduce the chances of parties ‘to translate reluctance to participate in 
new arrangements into overt or covert obstructionism’, and support cooperation. 146  As 
geoengineering remains deeply controversial, both nationally and internationally, the 
likelihood that veto powers and obstructionism inhibit collaboration in this new system is 
certainly high. 
 With respect to participation of civil society, some international NGOs and scientific 
groups have contributed, in the plenary and the working groups, to express concerns, share 
technical and scientific expertise, and submit draft texts.147 The question however remains as 
to whether such participation opportunities will be retained as during the negotiation process, 
once (and if) the amendments come into force. Although lacking decision-making power, 
non-state actors’ participation increasingly play an important role in global governance of 
technologies, from providing technical and scientific expertise to inform the learning 
exercise, to claiming more substantive participation in the decision-making process. 148 It is 
precisely with respect to the space for public participation in the deliberative process that the 
new LP mechanism appears limited, giving rise to the second barrier to experimentalist 
governance. Active participation by a broad range of stakeholders is a key feature of 
experimentalist governance, as a contribution to transparency and deliberative democracy.149 
But, the mechanisms of public participation in environmental decision-making are 
multifaceted, ranging from minimal consultation on technical matters to more deliberative 
approaches. 150  
Participation in the LP regime takes place mainly within the boundaries of the impact 
assessment under the Assessment Framework(s). In that context, the exchange of 
information to support decision-making occurs exclusively between project proponents, 
national authorities in charge of the permitting process, and possibly independent 
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international experts. The specific AFSR include (minimal) avenues for consultation with 
stakeholders, mostly during the mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment for field 
experiments. Clearly, the choice of regulatory mechanisms for public participation in the 
permitting and implementation process for geoengineering research rests with the national 
authorities, leaving them considerable discretion. The AFSR procedure is highly technical 
and there are limited avenues for civil society to intercept it and engage. But, even when 
consulted, they have no official voice outside this precise realm, resulting in a limited ability 
to influence the international law decision-making process. 
More importantly, the substantive grounds for participation are largely pre-framed 
within the limits of technical and scientific reasons under the Assessment Framework(s) 
umbrella. The evaluation of a project relies almost exclusively upon its risk assessment and 
management, while disregarding potential social, cultural and ethical concerns associated 
with it. For instance, while ‘social and economic factors such as whether the activity, or 
regulation of the activity, could have important social and economic effects, including 
distributional effects, e.g. affecting certain countries or population groups’ must be 
considered, they are likely to be interpreted as merely measurable impacts. 151   
In this context, cultural values, concerns beyond risk and alternative discourses about 
the technology may be equally important to reach ‘good decisions’ on the regulation and 
governance of technologies. 152  However, under these amendments, their legitimacy is 
overshadowed by a clear emphasis on merely technical, quantitative risk assessments, where 
other rationalities are not captured. This is unfortunate, but not overly surprising, given the 
enormous and perennial challenges of addressing socio-cultural values beyond risk in the 
governance of technological change, which are surely magnified at the international level.153  
This shows that public participation is conceived as an institutionalised process between 
pre-determined actors (i.e. national authorities, project developers and experts, affected local 
communities), insofar as it is to contribute to a defined and technical procedure to assess 
new proposals or new techniques. Although some of the LP Parties have obligations under 
the UNECE Aarhus Convention to provide effective mechanisms for public participation in 
the decision-making, access to information and access to justice on environmental matters, 
this instrument has a mainly regional scope and focuses on the national decision-making, 
rather than on opportunities for deliberative participation of civil society in international 
decisions-making and governance mechanisms.154 
This analysis suggests that there is an unavoidable obstacle to qualify the new marine 
geoengineering regime as an example of global experimentalist governance, as this mode of 
governance is deeply focused on wide participation, especially from civil society groups, to 
increase dynamic accountability and transparency. Indeed, as Sabel et al note, 
experimentalist governance intends to reduce the gap between overall responsiveness of the 
governance system and democratic participation broadly conceived. Opening the decision-
making to a variety of actors and a multiplicity of rationalities would then be a necessary 
condition to achieve deliberative outcomes under an experimentalist governance 
architecture. This would be of particular importance in the context of international 
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regulation of controversial technologies, such as geoengineering, if we are to seriously 
address social and ethical concerns beyond risk. 
 It now seems clear that, while some experimentalist elements are present, the new 
international regime for marine geoengineering falls short of embracing an experimentalist 
approach to problem-solving and multilevel distribution of power. Here, the two important 
features of cooperation between decision-makers and participation of civil society are 
confined, and there is no system of penalty default to provide an incentive towards their 
widening. This reduces the potential of the new LP amendment to represent an ideal type of 
experimentalist governance, to a much more modest example of loose experimentalist 
governance. Under these circumstances then, the advantages of flexibility and adaptability 
provided under this new global governance mechanism for climate change technologies are 
outweighed by a limited scope for effectively scrutinising the legitimacy of the decision-
making process through cooperation and participation. From a global governance point of 
view, it seems that the key question about how decisions on controversial climate change 
technologies are made and who might legitimately make them is yet to be properly 
disentangled.  
VIII. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The idea of intentionally manipulating the climate through technology inevitably calls for a 
deeper reflection upon societal values and the human place in nature vis-à-vis climate 
change. 155  As a result, meaningful considerations about their potential global governance 
and regulation are not premature. 
 In the face of the limits of international law in addressing strategic uncertainty, 
multilevel distribution of power and regulatory disconnection, global experimentalist 
governance is normatively attractive. As a minimum, its implementation in a geoengineering 
research context would catalyze adaptability to changing scientific and technological 
knowledge, iterative learning from different experiences, deliberative participation of civil 
society and cooperation between decision-makers at different levels of governance. This 
could help redirect the role of traditional international law to better reflect the need for a 
flexible, adaptive and participatory control of these techniques. As such, lessons from 
experimentalist governance would then make a very valuable contribution to the governance 
of emerging climate change technologies, more broadly, in re-shaping the international 
decision-making process to effectively respond to strategic uncertainty, multilevel 
distribution of power and regulatory disconnection, and ultimately strengthen the problem-
solving function of international law. 
 The analysis of the recent marine geoengineering amendments to the London Protocol 
has shown that there is a potential for experimentalist governance approaches to address these 
challenges in the global governance of climate change technologies. However, a limited 
scope for cooperation between decision-makers and participation of civil society prevents it 
to embody an ideal type of this new mode of governance. But although it falls short of 
constituting a pure model, the new regulatory framework for ocean fertilization under the 
London Protocol could be viewed as a case for a slow shift towards global experimentalist 
governance in the field of climate change technologies as it presents some of its foundational 
features. Such approach could help re-think global problem-solving and decision-making in 
the area of climate change technologies, against the backstop of international treaty rules and 
customary international law principles.  
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